Big Cities v. Big Banks: Does a Municipality Have Standing To Sue? by Hussein, Hamda
University of Baltimore Journal of Land and
Development
Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 3
2017
Big Cities v. Big Banks: Does a Municipality Have
Standing To Sue?
Hamda Hussein
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjld
Part of the Land Use Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact hmorrell@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hussein, Hamda (2017) "Big Cities v. Big Banks: Does a Municipality Have Standing To Sue?," University of Baltimore Journal of Land
and Development: Vol. 6 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjld/vol6/iss2/3
RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
111 
BIG CITIES V. BIG BANKS:  
DOES A MUNICIPALITY HAVE STANDING TO SUE? 
Hamda Hussein 
I. INTRODUCTION
The mortgage lending practices of banks and their impact on inner-city
housing is a big issue that impacts societal growth, especially when such 
practices may be discriminatory.1 During the month of November, the 
Supreme Court heard arguments for lawsuits filed by the City of Miami 
against Wells Fargo and Bank of America in order to address the issue of 
whether a city can be an “aggrieved person” under the Fair Housing Act of 
1968 (FHA).2 In 2013, Miami filed these lawsuits upon finding a 
disproportionate number of defaults in home loans between black and 
Latino homebuyers,3 alleging that the banks violated the FHA through their 
lending practices. Banks argue that Miami lacks standing under the FHA 
because its suits fall outside of the statute’s “zone of interests” and the 
banks’ actions could not be sufficiently linked to the harms claimed by 
Miami.4 
The FHA makes it unlawful for any person or entity, whose business 
includes engaging in residential, real estate-related transactions, to 
discriminate against any person because of race, color, religion, sex, etc.5 
Such transactions include the making or purchasing of loans for the purpose 
of purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a 
dwelling.6  In order for a plaintiff to have standing for an FHA violation 
suit, they must allege: (1) an actual injury, (2) a causal link between the 
injury and the actions of defendant(s), and (3) that a favorable judicial 
outcome would redress the injury.7   
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
1. Mark Walsh, SCOTUS will decide whether Miami can sue banks under the Fair
Housing Act, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 2016,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/scotus_miami_bank_of_america.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (1968).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(1)(A) (1968).
7. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1272 (11th Cir. 2015).
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dismissed Miami’s suits, stating that they did not have standing to bring 
these cases.8 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, 
stating that the term “aggrieved person” can be expanded as far as Article 
III of the US Constitution permits, and that Miami has standing under the 
FHA.9 If considered an “aggrieved person”, Miami would have standing to 
sue for redress, for the harms derived from alleged discriminatory 
practices.10 This would allow not only Miami, but other big cities with 
similar lawsuits, to deal with such discriminatory lending practices.11 
However, this Supreme Court decision could have a big impact on big 
banks and may open the “floodgates” for other lawsuits.12 
II. BACKGROUND & HISTORY OF STANDING UNDER THE FHA
A. The Supreme Court Has Held That Disparate-Impact Claims Are
Recognized And Have Standing Under A FHA Lawsuit
 Article III of the Constitution grants the courts the power to hear cases 
that arise out of the Constitution and laws of the United States.13 Title VIII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair Housing Act, was 
created to prohibit discrimination in the sale, rental and financing of 
dwellings because of race, national origin, religion, sex, family status and 
disability.14 In regards to mortgage lending, no lender may impose different 
terms or conditions on a loan, such as different interest rates or fees, based 
on race, religion, national origin, sex, family status or disability.15 In 
determining whether a case would have standing under the FHA, the 
Supreme Court, like the Eleventh Circuit, would likely look to several of its 
past decisions where the high court has recognized standing in disparate-
impact claims,16 and has acknowledged a broad use of the term “aggrieved 
8. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95445 (S.D. Fla.
Jul. 9 2014); see also City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 41893 (S.D. Fla., Mar. 17, 2016).
9. City of Miami v. Bank of Am., 800 F.3d at 1273; see also City of Miami v. Wells
Fargo & Co., 801 F.3d 1258, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015)
10. Walsh, supra note 1.
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
14. Fair Housing –It’s Your Right, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_o
pp/FHLaws, (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
15. Id.
16. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2525 (2015).
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person” under FHA.17 
Regarding disparate-impact claims, the Supreme Court has recently held 
that such claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.18 In Tex. Dep’t 
of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., the high Court 
ruled that a nonprofit corporation’s disparate impact claim against the Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs under the FHA was 
cognizable.19 The suit occurred due to disproportionate allocation of tax 
credits in predominantly black inner-city areas compared to white suburban 
neighborhoods.20 The Court stated that the FHA’s results-oriented language 
and the court’s interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 allow it to 
recognize disparate-impact claims under the FHA.21 Title VII protects 
against employment discrimination and other unlawful employment 
practices on the basis of race, national origin, sex, family status or 
disability.22 Because the language of the FHA is focused on preventing 
discriminatory policy based not on the use of race, but the resulting impact 
of the policy, disparate-impact claims therefore have standing under the 
FHA, similarly to Title VII claims.23 
B. The Supreme Court Has Also Maintained That An “Aggrieved
Person” Can Be Broadly Defined To Determine Whether A
Plaintiff Has Standing Under A FHA Lawsuit
 The Supreme Court has recently held that the term “aggrieved” in Title 
VII allows a suit by plaintiffs who have an interest within statutory 
protections while excluding plaintiffs whose interests are unrelated to the 
prohibitions under Title VII.24 In Thompson v. North American Stainless, 
LP, the Court held that a plaintiff may not sue unless their claim fall within 
the “zones of interests”.25 The term “aggrieved” in Title VII incorporates 
the “zones of interest” test26 by allowing any plaintiff to have standing 
when they have an interest that is arguably sought to be protected by the 
17. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); See also Gladstone,
Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); See also Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
18. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2017).
23. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
24. Walsh, supra note 1.
25. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 177-78 (2011).
26. Id. (stating that a plaintiff does not have a right to file a claim if they are not
claiming an injury to an interest that is protected by the law in question).
114 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development  Vol. 6 
law.27 
Additionally, in relying on previous Supreme Court cases, the Eleventh 
Circuit court found that the application of the term “aggrieved person” is as 
broad as the Constitution allows. In Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood in 1979, and Havens Realty 
Corp. v. Coleman, the Supreme Court mentioned that the term “aggrieved” 
in the FHA extends as far as Article III permits.28 However, the Court in 
Thompson, while not overruling the previous courts, deemed that previous 
courts’ suggestions about the broad application of “aggrieved person” were 
nothing more than “ill-considered dictum”.29 
The Eleventh Circuit court in Nasser v. Homewood took a stricter 
position.30 The court stated that a plaintiff has no standing under the FHA if 
they make no allegation of discrimination or disparate impact.31 The 
plaintiff’s claim in Nasser only alleged an economic injury, claiming that 
the rezoning of their property would cost them money.32 Thus, the court 
found that the plaintiff’s claim was for interest in the value of the property 
rather than an interest that is protected by the FHA.33 
C. Instant Cases
 In the case of Miami, the city claims that the banks aimed predatory 
loans, which carried steeper, riskier fees and higher costs, at minority 
customers and not at white customers in similar circumstances.34 The loans 
included higher interest rates than those rates established by federal 
benchmarks, interest-only loans, balloon payment loans, loans with 
prepayment penalties, and adjustable rate mortgages with teaser rates.35 
After conducting an analysis of the situation, Miami found that a black 
Wells Fargo borrower was about four times more likely to receive a 
predatory loan than a white borrower with similar circumstances.36 Also, a 
Latino Wells Fargo borrower was about 1.5 times more likely to receive 
such loans than a similarly situated white borrower.37 Miami’s suits allege 
that by guiding minority borrowers into these alleged predatory loans, the 
27. Thompson, 562 U.S. at 177-78.
28. Walsh, supra note 1.
29. Thompson, 562 U.S. at 176.
30. See Nasser v. Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 437 (11th Cir. 1982).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 437.
34. Walsh, supra note 1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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banks caused their properties to fall into foreclosure more rapidly than for 
white borrowers.38 As a result, the city was deprived of tax revenue and was 
required to spend more to deal with the resulting consequences.39 
At trial, the banks argued for dismissal of the case because the city 
lacked standing under the FHA.40 The banks claimed that the suits fall 
outside the statute’s “zone of interests” and that the banks’ actions could 
not be sufficiently linked to the injuries claimed by Miami.41 The Federal 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida agreed and dismissed 
Miami’s suits.42 However, the Eleventh Circuit later reversed the lower 
court’s ruling, stating that the phrase “aggrieved person” in the FHA 
extends standing as far as allowed under Article III of the Constitution.43 It 
also held that the city’s allegations were sufficient to meet the housing 
law’s proximate-cause requirement.44 Miami’s suits alleged the banks’ 
discriminatory lending caused minority homeowners to enter premature 
foreclosure, which deprived the city of tax revenue and increased municipal 
expenditures.45 The court determined that although there are several links in 
that causal chain, none are unforeseeable, and therefore the claims 
sufficiently show a causal link.46 The case is now before the Supreme Court 
and a decision should come soon.47 
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court Is Likely To Find That The Term “Aggrieved
Person” Is Broadly Applied And That Miami Would Have Standing
Under This Status
 The purpose of the FHA is to prevent discrimination against minorities in 
residential real-estate related policies.48 While Miami attempts to combat 
alleged discriminatory lending practices that would violate the FHA, if it is 
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. City of Miami v. Bank of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95445, at *15; see also City
of Miami v. Wells Fargo, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41893, at *15-16.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. City of Miami v. Bank of Am., 800 F.3d at 1273; see also City of Miami v. Wells
Fargo, 801 F.3d at 1267.
44. City of Miami v. Bank of Am, 800 F.3d at 1283; see also City of Miami v. Wells
Fargo, 801 F.3d at 1267.
45. Walsh, supra note 1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Fair Housing –It’s Your Right, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra
note 14.
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not considered an “aggrieved person” under the FHA, Miami would have 
no standing in its lawsuits.49 But, it is very likely that the Supreme Court 
agrees with the appellate court’s decision. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court, using dictum from Trafficante, Gladstone, 
and Havens, and distinguishing the case from Nasser and Thompson, 
reversed the trial court’s decision that the term “aggrieved” person did not 
apply to the municipalities like Miami.50 Because Trafficante, Gladstone, 
and Havens have never been overruled, the court felt that the rulings which 
state that statutory standing under the FHA extends as broadly as is 
constitutionally permissible under Article III.51 While the Thompson court 
treated the rulings as merely “ill-considered dictum”, it never overruled 
those courts.52 Thompson was a Title VII case, not a Fair Housing Act 
case.53 Title VII does contain similar language as the FHA, and therefore 
the Thompson ruling might suggest a possible narrowing of the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the FHA in the future.54 
But, it is more likely that the Supreme Court uses the broader application 
in the case of Miami. In Gladestone, the Court granted standing to a village 
that sued a reality firm for violating the FHA in using racial steering.55 The 
Court not only emphasized that Congress could expand the standing under 
the FHA for as far as Article III allows56, but also stated that, in no event, 
could Congress decrease Article III.57 What this suggests is that the Court is 
likely to use a broader application of standing within the FHA. Miami’s 
lawsuits are intended to end the alleged discriminatory lending practices 
that harm the city’s fair housing efforts.58 Because the FHA was created to 
protect society from such discriminatory actions,59 the Supreme Court is 
likely to find that Miami’s interest, to protect against discriminatory 
lending, falls within the zone of interest of the FHA. 
49. Walsh, supra note 1.
50. City of Miami v. Bank of Am., 800 F.3d at 1277; see City of Miami v. Wells
Fargo, 801 F.3d at 1267; see also cases cited supra note 16; but see sources cited
supra notes 1, 25-29 and accompanying text.
51. Id.
52. City of Miami v. Bank of Am., 800 F.3d at 1277; See also City of Miami v. Wells
Fargo, 801 F.3d at 1267.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Walsh, supra note 1.
56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
57. Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100.
58. Walsh, supra note 1.
59. Fair Housing –It’s Your Right, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra
note 14.
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B. While The Supreme Court Might Find Miami’s Claim Falls Within
The Zones Of Interest Of The FHA, The Court May Have Trouble
Finding A Sufficient Causal Link When the Perceived Injury is
Economic
 The Eleventh Circuit Court determined that Miami’s claim was sufficient 
to find a causal link between the lending practices of the banks and the 
disparate-impact injury Miami alleges. The banks argue that there are too 
many links between the alleged injury and their actions. Both arguments 
come down to how the Supreme Court interprets Miami’s alleged injury.   
If the Supreme Court considers the purpose of FHA60 and looks at what 
Miami has presented to the court, the court is likely to find a sufficient 
causal link. Miami argues that the discriminatory mortgage-lending 
practices at issue directly harm the city’s fair housing efforts, deprive the 
city of the benefits of an integrated community, decrease property values 
and tax revenues, and increase in demand for police presence.61 
Additionally, the statistical disparities amongst black and Latino borrowers 
should be enough to show existence of disparate impact because of the 
lending practices.62 Therefore, the Court, in keeping with its past cases, 
should likely find a causal link between the banks’ lending practices and the 
harm done to the city. 
However, the banks make a valid argument. Miami acknowledges that 
their injury has an economic component.63 Banks argue that Miami is no 
different from other individuals and entities that suffered economic losses 
after the collapse of the housing market.64 Per the Eleventh Circuit in 
Nasser, a plaintiff’s interest involving value of property, or some other 
economic impact, does not implicate an interest that is protected by the 
FHA.65 Among the injuries Miami claims, loss of tax revenue from inner 
citing housing is an economic injury that does not fall within the interests 
protected by the FHA.66 However, unlike in Nasser, Miami claims includes 
more than just an economic injury claim. They claim an economic jury that 
specifically falls within FHA.67 The impact of discriminatory lending 
practices leads not only to economic harm to property values and tax 
revenues, but does so in a manner that harms minorities as well, and 
60. Fair Housing –It’s Your Right, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra
note 14.
61. Walsh, supra note 1.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. City of Miami v. Bank of Am., 800 F.3d at 1278 (citing Nasser, 671 F.2d at 437).
66. Walsh, supra note 1.
67. Id.
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prevents the city from maintaining integrated communities.68 While the 
banks have a valid argument about an economic motive for Miami to sue, 
they do not sufficiently challenge other possible interests that the city has, 
like protecting community diversity.69 
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the outcome, the decision will have a big impact on FHA
and the government’s ability to sue under the law.70 The Supreme Court 
should likely agree with the appellate court. The definition of “aggrieved 
person” can be expanded as far as the Constitution allows, which means the 
court can deem a municipality to be an “aggrieved person” under FHA.71 
Additionally, while the Supreme Court might find Miami’s claim falls 
within the zones of interest of the FHA, it may have trouble finding a 
sufficient causal link between injury and defendant’s actions when the 
injury could be perceived as an economic injury.72 The Court decision here 
will either open up the “floodgates” for more municipalities to sue or limit 
the power these municipalities have under the FHA.73 
68. Id.
69. City of Miami v. Bank of Am., 800 F.3d at 1278.
70. Walsh, supra note 1.
71. City of Miami v. Bank of Am., 800 F.3d at 1278; see also City of Miami v. Wells
Fargo, 801 F.3d at 1267.
72. Walsh, supra note 1.
73. Id.
